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Natural phenomena in mountains put people and assets at risk. Risk reduction measures can be either structural
(protection works) or non-structural (risk zoning maps). In torrential watersheds of the French mountains, many
checkdams have been built since the 19th century. As any civil engineered structure, those dams age and their
failures may have severe effects on protected areas. Thus, preserving their level of efficacy is of a high interest. In
a context of decreasing public budgets, it is necessary to assess their structural, functional and economic efficacy
in order to quantify the residual risk and to choose the best maintenance strategies. Recent global approach has
been proposed to integrate safety and reliability analysis, multicriteria decision-making methods, and information
imperfection processing. However, it does not help in choosing the best strategy to maintain protection devices.
It does not cover all aspects related to protection works management making the balance between investment,
preventive maintenance costs, and risk evolution. This paper develops a contribution addressing all those issues and
proposes a new modeling approach based on Petri nets, whose main steps are: 1) to describe multi-scale protection
works systems interaction between both natural and technological systems’ components; 2) to analyze structural and
functional failure modes; 3) to develop a Petri net model for deterioration and maintenance modeling; 4) to compare
different maintenance strategies under different hypothesis on degradation and damage processes.
Keywords: Preventive maintenance, deterioration modeling, decision-making, Petri nets, protection structures,
checkdams.
1. Introduction
Mountainous regions, e.g. French Alpes, are
usually exposed to different types of natural phe-
nomena such as torrential floods, debris flows,
landslides, etc. These hazards will pose a threat
to humans and to vulnerable assets resulting in
direct destruction and indirect economical dam-
ages. The magnitude and the sudden effects of
natural phenomena push to acquire a compre-
hensive knowledge about their dynamics as well
as means and alternatives for protecting people
and properties. In mountain streams, since the
19th century, engineers have tried to reduce the
risk generated from torrential activities by con-
structing a series of torrential protection works
along the watershed. Among all civil engineer-
ing structures, checkdams are perhaps the most
used. Although protection structures aim in risk
prevention and mitigation, yet, they are consid-
ered as critical structures because they constitute
a complex system that age, deteriorate, and may
be damaged overtime with a high level of induced
consequences. As the level of deterioration of pro-
tection works increases, their performance level
decreases and the risk is no more reduced as much
as it should be.
Assessing the efficacy of protection structures
is linked to the efficacy expected at the design
phase, after construction, and in service Carladous
(2017). Moreover, it involves three aspects
Tacnet et al. (2016): structural, functional, and
economical efficacy. Consequently, evaluating
the efficacy of protection structures requires in-
spection visits conducted regularly at defined time
intervals. Inspections are based on indicators ex-
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tracted from pathologies and evaluated by visual
observation.
Interdependencies between failures may occur
either within the same component or within the
different components of the system (cascade fail-
ure Kotzanikolaou et al. (2013)). To avoid the
failure of a complete system of protection works,
maintenance of these structures must be ensured
over time. Maintenance operations aim in im-
proving the quality, reliability, safety, and depend-
ability of a system Arab Maki and Shariat Zadeh
(2010). Two types of maintenance can be distin-
guished: preventive maintenance, applied before
the failure of the system and corrective mainte-
nance (replacement), carried out after the failure
of the system. In order for decision-makers to
choose between several alternatives to be applied
to a system, it is essential to monitor these struc-
tures during their lifetime period and to model
their evolution from one state to another when
they are exposed to deterioration mechanisms
or maintenance strategies. Presently, decision-
making in the domain of maintenance manage-
ment plays a significant role in progressing pro-
ductivity efficiency and in enhancing maintenance
budget Sabaei et al. (2015).
Dependability analysis starts by defining all the
functions of the system, analyzing all the possible
failure modes and proposing various procedures
to reduce the associated risk. Reliability is one
aspect of dependability. It is defined as the ability
of the system to operate under certain conditions
and for a specified period of time. It is essential to
model the interdependencies between the various
components that constitute the system in order to
determine the overall system reliability. Indeed,
several methods Modarres (1992) are used for
this purpose such as fault tree analysis, event tree
analysis, failure mode and effect analysis, etc. The
main idea is to represent graphically the logic of
a dysfunction of a system due to an occurring
event. All these methods are used to predict the
performance of the structure, take decisions, and
to mitigate failure.
In fact, several maintenance strategies and so-
lutions can be carried out on a system when ex-
posed to a certain failure. However, with the
help of decision-aiding models, decision-makers
can justify rigorously the choice of which strat-
egy to follow. Cost-benefit analysis is the most
widely used decision support method for assess-
ing the economic component of system efficacy.
Yet, the choice of the model to be applied on a
given system should be based on accepting certain
hypothesis, principals, and assumptions. In the
present study, decision-aiding models based on
Petri nets will be presented. These models are
able to describe the behavior of the system during
its lifetime period. Petri nets offer a flexible
and efficient method to model the deterioration
and maintenance process of structures. It has the
capacity to model the reality compared to other
developed models Le and Andrews (2016).
In the next section, a brief description of Petri
net models is provided. The third section presents
the proposed structure of the Petri net model that
can be applied to any system. The proposed model
is then applied in the fourth section for mod-
eling the behavior of checkdams when exposed
to functional and structural deterioration and to
maintenance operations. In the fifth section, the
results obtained after simulating the model are
discussed. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the
work achieved and suggestions for further devel-
opments.
2. Petri Nets (PNs)
PNs were developed by the German Carl Adam
in the 1962 Adam (1962). Since then, they have
been developed and extended to be applied for
railway networks Andrews (2013) and bridge risk
assessment Le et al. (2017). PNs are graphical
tools similar to the directed bipartite graphs that
can be simulated to analyze existing processes
arising in systems with different components.
2.1. PNs elements
PNs consist of four different elements: places, to-
kens, transitions and arcs. A place, symbolized by
a circle, corresponds to a state of the system and
represents a certain condition. A token, denoted
by a filled solid small circle, is located in a place
to indicate the state of the system at a given time.
A transition, symbolized by a rectangle, is respon-
sible of moving tokens from a place to another due
to an event which leads to the change of state in
the system. Arcs, represented by arrows, connect
places to transitions and vice versa. The direction
of the arc represents the input or output place
of the transition. Each arc is characterized by
a certain multiplicity given by a natural number.
When the multiplicity of an arc is not indicated, it
is by default equals to one.
2.1.1. PNs operation
 Transition firing: a transition is enabled if and
only if each of its input places is marked by a
number of tokens at least equal to the multi-
plicity of the arc connecting it to the transition.
Once the transition is enabled, it will be fired
removing tokens from the input places and de-
positing tokens in the output places according
to their arc multiplicities.
 Transition firing time: it represents the resi-
dence time of a token in a place (sojourn time).
It is a necessary data that control the simulation
of the PN model. The determination of firing
delay time can be either given deterministically
(Deterministic Timed PNs) or probabilistically
(Stochastic Timed PNs).
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Fig. 1. Simple PN illustrating firing process and inhibitor arc
 Inhibitor arc: additional form of arcs repre-
sented by dashed arc and can be only directed
from a place to a transition. It aims to keep
the transition disabled inhibiting it from firing.
This is accomplished when the multiplicity of
the inhibitor arc is equal to the number of to-
kens in the input place.
A simple PN example is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The number of tokens in the input places P1, P2
and P3 (1, 4, 1) of transitions T1 and T2 is equal
or above the arcs multiplicity of each (1, 3, 1).
Hence, T1 and T2 are enabled. However, the
token in place P4 inhibits the firing of transition
T2. Therefore, after time t, T1 is only fired, and a
number of tokens equal to the multiplicity of each
arc is removed from the input places of T1 and
deposited to the output places of T1.
2.1.2. Stochastic Petri nets SPNs
SPNs follow probabilistic models on transitions
based on historical records and data used for
dependability modeling. Stochastic models are
superior to other modeling techniques because
they offer practicality and reliability Yianni et al.
(2017).
In dependability assessment, stochastic vari-
ables are time variables such as the time taken by
a component to fail or to be repaired Aubry et al.
(2016). This reveals that the crucial elements
which are able to represent the behavior of the
system are the transition firing times. SPNs are
thus specialized by the occurrence of an event
characterized by a rate giving the time needed for
the transition to be fired. In the presence of such
variables, their will be no conflict between the
firing of the transitions since the fired transition
will be the one whose associated event occurs first.
Several probability distributions are used in
reliability analysis. Exponential distribution is
usually used for its simplicity because it con-
siders a constant failure rate. However, some
researchers considered that constant failure rates
are rarely appropriate for deterioration modeling
Le and Andrews (2016). This refers to the fact
that failure process represented by exponential
distribution cannot model the aging of the system.
3. PN Modeling Structure
This section presents the global framework of the
PN model able to describe the evolution of the
state of a system when exposed to degradation
processes or to maintenance actions. The model
permits to compare the maintenance strategies in
terms of efficiency and cost.
The PN model is constructed using GRIF
(2017) software developed by TOTAL. The GRIF
package related to PN modeling, uses the MOCA-
RP computation engine, based on Monte Carlo
simulation, which is generally used for evaluat-
ing the reliability of a complex system Sava et al.
(2015). After each simulation, the sojourn time in
each state and number of occurrence of different
events can be obtained.
3.1. Deterioration process
A gradual deterioration model is based on the ex-
istence of a degradation indicator, able to provide
information about the degradation level of the sys-
tem at a specified time. In fact, each deterioration
mechanism corresponds to a degradation indicator
which reveals the state of the system. Hence,
this model is required for the determination of the
number of places in the PN. In this model, it is
considered, based on an expert that the system
resides in one of the four states: new, poor, very
poor and failed.
An example of a net modeling the deteriora-
tion process is represented in Fig. 2. The four
states describing the evolution of the system are
represented by places: P1 - P4. P1 corresponds
to the new state of the system, P2 and P3 are the
intermediate states, and P4 represents the failure
of the system. Transitions T1 - T3 link between
the degraded states. The firing delay times cor-
responding to these transitions should be given as
probability distributions based on historical data
or on assumptions made by experts.
At t = 0, a token is placed in P1 revealing that,
at the initial state, the system is considered to be
new.
3.2. Inspection process
The state of the system will only be detected
following an inspection. The system will be in-
spected periodically. Inspections will take place
at a determined regular time interval tinsp that
corresponds to the firing of the transition T5.
At t = 0, an additional token is added to
P5. When the firing delay time tinsp of transition
T5 is reached, the token travels to P6 in which
inspection takes place. Consequently, one of the
immediate transitions T6, T7 or T8 will immedi-
ately fire if a token exists respectively in P2, P3
or P4. In addition, T4 will fire and the token will
February 27, 2019 10:55 RPS/Trim Size: 221mm x 173mm for Proceedings/Edited Book esrel2019-paper
4 Chahrour et al.
Fig. 2. An example of Petri net model (S.Hariri)
return to P5 waiting for another inspection to take
place after a period of time tinsp.
When the system is in state 2, a token is present
in P2 and two possible pathways exist. If tran-
sition T6 is fired first, the token will move to
P7 meaning that the system is inspected and a
maintenance operation will be applied. However,
if transition T2 is fired first, the token will travel
to P3 which means the system has degraded to
state 3 before being inspected. Similarly, if the
system is in state 3, a token is present in P3 and
may either move to P8 (T7 is fired first) where the
system is inspected and a maintenance operation
will be applied or it moves to the failed state P4
(T3 is fired first) before being inspected. If the
system is in state 4, a token is present in P4 and
only T8 can be fired. The system will wait for
inspection to occur and a maintenance operation
will be applied.
3.3. Maintenance process
When the condition or the state of the system
is identified, the appropriate type of maintenance
operation can be applied to restore the system to
its initial state. A condition-based maintenance
policy is applied in this model in which each
state will correspond to a maintenance operation.
Places P7 - P9 represent the states revealed after
inspection. When a token is present in P7, P8 or
P9, this indicates that maintenance operation 1, 2
or 3 is required respectively. Following mainte-
nance, transition T9, T10 or T11 fires and moves
the token to P1. Transitions T9 - T11 represent
the repair planning time for each maintenance
operation, which is the time needed to schedule
and carry out the work.
Maintenance operations presented in this model
are considered perfect. The system is restored to
the initial new state after the application of each
maintenance operation.
3.4. Comparison of strategies
The addition of places P10 - P11, associated with
inhibitor arcs, permits the simulation of different
maintenance strategies. If P10 is marked with a
token, T6 is inhibited and will not fire as long
as the token in P10 remains. Consequently, over
the lifetime period of the system, maintenance
operation 1 cannot take place and the system is
allowed to degrade further to state 3. Similarly,
different strategies can be considered by adding
a token to P11 for example, where maintenance
operation 2 cannot be carried out.
After simulation, the model provides the num-
ber of maintenance operations applied in each
strategy. Therefore, knowing the cost of each
maintenance operation, the total cost of each
maintenance strategy can be computed. As men-
tioned before, the model is able to provide the
sojourn time of the system in each state. These
outcomes can be adequate for making a decision
regarding the most suitable maintenance strategy
to be applied to the system.
4. Application on Checkdams
This application is selected in order to illustrate
the capabilities of the modeling approach to evalu-
ate different maintenance strategies. Checkdams,
as critical structures, show complexities in relating
possible failures and indicators responsible for
their evolution. Complexity is also related to the
fact that a system can be composed of several
components interacting with each other to accom-
plish the systems functions. The main objective
of the approach developed is to show that the
methodology coming more from industrial issue
can support decision-making.
Checkdams aim to reduce the causes that leads
to the occurrence of risks generated from moun-
tains. Their main functions are torrent bed stabi-
lization, slope reduction, prevention of longitudi-
nal erosion, and flow centering. However intense
waterfall evacuated by the center of the hydraulic
section of checkdams results in scouring under
the center of their foundations. This phenomenon
affects the performance level of checkdams in ful-
filling their functions. The level of scouring will
increase over time and may reach critical levels in
which failure may occur. The present study aims
to investigate the stability of checkdams when
confronting the risk of scouring and then to choose
the most suitable maintenance strategy.
Scouring is considered as a functional failure
which will then lead to a structural failure by
affecting the external stability of the checkdam.
As the level of scouring increases, the structure
will be subjected to tilting. In this case, if no
intervention is made, the structure will continue
to tilt more until it fails by overturning which is
considered as a structural failure. Fig. 3 represents
the behavior of the system in four different states.
Each state is a combination of a functional state
(FS) and a structural state (SS).
The interaction between structural and func-
tional states evolutions is actually linked to the
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Fig. 3. Degradation states due to scouring of a checkdam
amount of scouring under the foundation of the
checkdam. It is assumed that if 20% of the foun-
dations’ width is scoured, the structure will start
to tilt. As the scour level increases, the struc-
ture will tilt more and more until it completely
fails by overturning when more than half of the
foundations’ width is scoured. However, struc-
tural deterioration may be also triggered by other
factors such as structural behavior. For example,
intense deposition increases the lateral pressure
thus affecting the stability of the checkdam.
4.1. Extended PN model
For modeling the stability of a checkdam, struc-
tural deterioration is modeled taking into account
its dependability with functional deterioration.
The model has an extended structure of that de-
veloped in Section 3.1 in which the interactions
between the different failure modes are considered
in addition to inspection and maintenance steps.
Fig. 4 represents the extended PN model applied
for analyzing the effect of functional deterioration
on the structural stability of the system allowing
the simulation of different maintenance strategies.
Four functional degradation states are defined:
FS1, FS2, FS3, and FS4 corresponding to 0%,
20%, 40%, and 50% scoured foundation respec-
tively. It is assumed that each of these states
influence the structural state of the structure. Thus
four structural states are also defined as SS1, SS2,
SS3, and SS4 corresponding to a new, poor, very
poor, and failed state of the structure.
At a first stage, this PN model does not consider
the fact that the structure may be subjected to a
certain functional deterioration but is still stable
from a structural point of view. Consequently,
in this case, maintenance can’t be applied at an
early time to prevent a structural failure due to
functional deterioration.
In Fig. 4, P1 is the new state in which there
is no scouring (FS1) and the structure is stable
(SS1). Places P12 - P14 represents the functional
degradation states (FS2, FS3, and FS4) and P2 -
P4 corresponds to the structural degradation states
(SS2, SS3, and SS4). Transitions T12 - T14 are
responsible for linking the functional degradation
states and T1 - T3 link structural degradation
states.
4.2. Deterioration, inspection, and
maintenance processes
The deterioration process is a combination be-
tween functional and structural deterioration. If
T12 fires before T1, the system will move to states
SS2 and FS2 due to a functional failure. On the
other hand, if T1 fires before T12, the system is
subjected to a structural failure first. Upon firing
of T13, scouring reaches 40% of the foundations
width. This will influence the structural stability
and the system will move from state SS2 to state
SS3. Similarly, when T14 fires, more than half of
the foundation is scoured and the system moves
from a very poor state to a failed state SS4. Note
that T13 and T14 are reset transition. Upon firing,
they remove the tokens in P2 and P3 respectively.
Regarding inspection process, it has the same
algorithm as that explained in Section 3.2. Con-
cerning maintenance operations, minor mainte-
nance is applied when the system is revealed to be
in a poor state. In this case, reparation is done only
for functional deterioration in which the scoured
area is refilled by earth material. If the system
is in a very poor state, major maintenance is re-
quired in which a (e.g.) riprap (rock or concrete)
is added to the scoured area to repair functional
degradation and the structural problem of tilting
can be repaired or prevented from becoming more
worse using (e.g.) riprap, anchor ties (steel beams
mortared at the end), or by constructing cantilever
supports made of reinforced concrete in the worst
Fig. 4. PN model - Application on checkdam
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case (more expensive). When the system reaches
a failed state, corrective maintenance is required
in which the system should be reconstructed.
However, it is assumed that only three mi-
nor operations and two major operations can be
performed before a replacement of the structure.
Hence, when P15 contains three tokens, minor
maintenance is inhibited until a replacement oc-
curs. Similarly, when P16 contains two tokens,
major maintenance is inhibited until corrective
maintenance takes place. For this reason, when
T11 fires, it resets places P15 and P16 in order
to empty them from tokens. Moreover, when
T9, T10, or T11 fires, a maintenance operation is
carried out and resets places P12 - P14 in which
the system is recovered and returns back to its new
state (FS1, SS1).
The input data needed to run this model are
the firing delay times associated with each transi-
tion. In this study, no historical data are available,
therefor these data are assumed and are presented
in Table 1.
Table 1. Transitions firing times.
Transition Exponential Failure Constant Firing
Rate  Time
(year 1) (year)
T1 0.2 -
T2 0.066 -
T3 0.2 -
T12 0.5 -
T13 0.1 -
T14 0.033 -
T4 T6 T7 T8 - 0
T5 - 1
T9 - 0.13
T10 - 0.082
T11 - 0.33
With respect to the firing times of transitions
linking the degraded states, it is assumed that for
functional deterioration, the time taken to degrade
from a state to another is increasing with the
increase of deterioration. Meaning that initially,
scouring will appear within a short time but its de-
velopment will be slower over time. For structural
deterioration, simple movement of the foundation
(settlement, mild tilting) may exist at an early
stage. However, a sharp tilting needs more time to
occur but when it happens, failure by overturning
may be triggered quickly. This explanation illus-
trates the variation of the firing times of T12 - T14
(functional) and T1 - T3 (structural) represented
in Table 1.
The main objective of this model is to act
as a decision-aiding tool. It compares different
maintenance strategies to help choose the most
appropriate one. This is achieved by inhibiting
certain maintenance operation using places P10
and P11 in the model as explained in Section 3.4.
Four different strategies are considered:
(i) Strategy 1: repair as soon as the system is
not in the new state (P10 and P11 are not
marked).
(ii) Strategy 2: minor maintenance is inhibited (a
token is added to P10).
(iii) Strategy 3: major maintenance is inhibited (a
token is added to P11).
(iv) Strategy 4: minor and major maintenance are
inhibited (a token is added to P10 and P11).
5. PN Simulation - Results & Discussion
The model is simulated over 100 year lifetime
period of the checkdam. Since the model follows
a stochastic process, many simulations are needed
to obtain precise results. The number of simu-
lations will be considered enough when conver-
gence of results occurs. In this study, convergence
is reached after 200 simulations for most of the
applied strategies.
Tables 2 - 4 summarize the results obtained
after the simulation of all maintenance strategies
applied for functional and structural deterioration.
Table 2. Statistics on the average expected number of each
type of maintenance operation.
Strategy Minor Major Corrective
1 11 6 3
2 0 7 4
3 18 0 7
4 0 0 8
Table 3. Statistics on the average sojourn time (year) in each
state - Functional deterioration.
Strategy FS1 FS2 FS3 FS4
1 29.63 58.73 10.05 0.17
2 16.70 69.53 12.04 0.20
3 33.69 44.13 20.28 0.40
4 12.41 59.80 25.70 0.44
Table 3 and Table 4 reveal the effect of each
maintenance strategy on the mean sojourn time. It
is clear that when minor maintenance is prevented
(strategies 2 and 4), the sojourn time of the system
in the initial states SS1 and FS1 will be less than
that when maintenance is applied directly when
the system is no more in its new state (strategies 1
and 3). The reason behind this is that when minor
February 27, 2019 10:55 RPS/Trim Size: 221mm x 173mm for Proceedings/Edited Book esrel2019-paper
Instructions for Preparing Paper for ESREL 2019 7
Table 4. Statistics on the average sojourn time (year) in each
state - Structural deterioration.
Strategy SS1 SS2 SS3 SS4
1 28.23 54.46 13.30 1.36
2 15.17 64.80 15.77 1.70
3 32.29 36.13 27.03 3.30
4 11.02 50.45 34.00 4.14
maintenance is disabled, the system will remain
in the degraded state SS2 for a longer time. In
strategy 3, since no major maintenance is allowed,
the system will reside for a long time in state SS3
( 27 years) in comparison with strategy 1 ( 13
year) and strategy 2 ( 15 years). Concerning
strategy 4, only corrective maintenance is allowed,
the system will reside for a long time in states
SS2 and SS3 waiting for more deterioration until
failure and the number of corrective maintenance
will increase compared to other strategies (8 re-
placements).
Such results allow comparing the different
maintenance strategies in terms of cost. It is
assumed that the costs of minor and major oper-
ations are respectively 5% and 50% the cost of a
replacement which is estimated to be 150,000 e.
Having the statistics about the number of ap-
plied maintenance operations provided by the PN
model, the total expected cost of each mainte-
nance strategy is computed and given in Table
5. Fig. 5 illustrates the variation in the costs
of the different maintenance operations in each
strategy. It is noticed that strategy 1 is the cheapest
due to the fact that the system is not allowed to
deteriorate to states where expensive maintenance
operations are required. It is repaired directly
with minor operations (less expensive). Strategy
4 seems to be the most expensive because of the
huge number of corrective maintenance in which
the structure is reconstructed.
Table 5. Total maintenance strategies costs (e).
Strategy Minor Major Corrective Total
1 82,500 450,000 450,000 982,500
2 0 525,000 600,000 1,125,000
3 135,000 0 1,050,000 1,185,000
4 0 0 1,200,000 1,200,000
6. Conclusion
This paper presents a methodology for modeling
the behavior of checkdams when exposed to de-
terioration mechanisms and maintenance opera-
tions based on PNs. The PN model considers
the deterioration, inspection through which the
Fig. 5. Expected total cost for each maintenance operation in
the four different strategies
system condition is revealed, and maintenance
processes of the system. The model is simulated
using Monte Carlo simulation where convergence
in results is attained after 200 simulations. All
processes are based on assumed input data due
to the absence of real historical records. The
model is used to compare different maintenance
strategies in which it allows the investigation of
the number of maintenance operations required,
the total cost of each maintenance strategy, and
the residence time of the system in each condition
over its lifetime period.
PNs prove their flexibility in which they al-
low to simulate different maintenance strategies
by simple modifications (inhibitor arcs) with-
out changing the structure of the model. This
model can support maintenance decision-making
by identifying the most appropriate strategy
Le and Andrews (2016). However, a comprehen-
sive understanding of the complex deterioration
process should be acquired before the calibration
of the model Yianni et al. (2017).
The application done in this study is not vali-
dated due to the fact that all the input data used
are assumed. The main target is to confirm the
capabilities of PN model to provide helpful results
supporting decision-making based on raw data
and expert knowledge.
Such work can be developed further to be vali-
dated and closer to reality. Proposals involve:
 Using real historical data concerning deterio-
ration and maintenance of torrential protection
works or assessing the assumed data by experts.
 Taking into consideration maintenance opera-
tions that are not always perfect to restore the
system to its initial new state.
 Studying the dependability between several
chackdams constructed in series (cascade fail-
ure).
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